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I.

Introduction
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses the use of sealed indictments by the international criminal

tribunals.* Specifically, this memorandum discusses the case law as it relates to the use of sealed
indictments by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugolsavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC), the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). In each section, this memorandum
will discuess the provisions that expressly allow sealed indictments as they appear in each
Tribunal’s rules of procedure and evidence. Additionally, this memorandum will review cases
that have utilized sealed indictments and the precedential effect these cases have in international
law. Finally, this memorandum will address the issue of whether it is legally possible to file and
confirm a sealed indictment in ex parte proceedings.
B. Summary of Conclusions
The ICTY and the ICTR expressly allow the use of sealed indictments evidenced by nondisclosure provisions enumerated in their rules of procedure and evidence. The SCSL also has
similar provisions in their rules of procedure and evidence; however, its case law in regards to
the use of sealed indictments is not as prevalent as the ICTY and the ICTR. The rules of
procedure and evidence of the STL allow the use of sealed indictments; however, the tribunal has
apparently not yet employed the use of sealed indictments to date. The ECCC currently does not
have any provisions that expressly allow the use of sealed indictments, nor has the tribunal

*

What is the case law of the international tribunals as it pertains to sealed indictments? Is it legally possible to issue
and confirm sealed indictments ex parte?

9

issued any indictments under seal thus far. Finally, although the ICC does not use sealed
indictments, it utilizes similar methods, such as sealed arrest warrants and summons to appear, to
hail unknowing defendants into its court. In each of the cases reviewed, the various Trial
Chambers offer little reasoning for their ordering of sealed indictments, but the repetitive use of
the procedure in international law is evidence that the international law community openly
accepts sealed indictments.
This memorandum also concludes that it is possible to issue sealed indictments in ex
parte proceedings for both implicit and explicit reasons. First, it is implied that one can legally
issue and confirm sealed indictments in ex parte proceedings. If it was not, then the accused’s
presence would be required during the proceeding (making it a non-ex parte proceeding), which
would defeat the need for a sealed indictment. It is possible that a tribunal may appoint a public
defender to represent the interests of the accused (in accordance with the respective tribunal’s
rules of procedure and evidence) making the proceeding non-ex parte; however, this option does
not seem feasible as the rules and procedure of many tribunals provide that counsel will only be
assigned to persons “detained under the authority of the tribunal."1 Since sealed indictments are
needed for the accused at large, it is unlikely the tribunal would appoint a public defender to
represent the absent accused’s interests. Further, no tribunal has utilized this tactic to date.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, sealed indictments are implicitly allowed under
international law.
Second, sealed indictments are also explicitly accepted by the international criminal
tribunals. As discussed below, Prosecutor’s motions for sealed indictments are always made ex
1

See e.g., Rule 53, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (hereinafter “ICTY RPE”) (2009). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 3].
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parte. Also, as illustrated, the Tribunal’s rarely deny these motions made by the Prosecutor.
Therefore, the actions by the Prosecutors and acceptance of these motions by the Tribunal
demonstrate that it is legally possible to issue sealed indictments ex parte.
II.

Factual Background
A sealed indictment is an indictment that is not made public until moments before the

indictee is taken into custody.2 Although some consider this practice unfair, David Crane, the
former Chief Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, believes that “sealed indictments
[are] instruments in shattering a suspect’s sense of security.”3
Sealed indictments first developed at the ICTY and ICTR. At the ICTY, an early
obstacle was making arrests.4 Richard Goldstone, the first Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY had
initially issued more than seventy indictments.5 However, out of these seventy public
indictments, only a handful of low-level defendants had been apprehended.6 After Goldstone’s
departure, Louise Arbour, a former Canadian Justice took over as Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY.7
Arbour felt that a main priority of the ICTY should be bringing higher level defendants to The
Hague for trial.8 To accomplish this, she adopted a “sealed indictment” strategy.9 This strategy

2

Tim Curry, Review of Conference: International Criminal Tribunals in the 21 st Century, 13 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF
6, 9 (2005). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 60].
3

Id.

4

Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3
HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 37, 38 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 57].
5

John Hagan, et al., Swaying the Hand of Injsutice: The Internal and External Dynamics of Regime Change at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 585, 596 (2006).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 56].
6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.
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received the approval of United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright and was deemed a
success by the ICTY and its investigative staff.10 Accordingly, sealed indictments were adopted
for their ability to prevent the accused from fleeing before authorities had a chance to bring him
into custody.
The sealed indictment strategy was first utilized against the Croatian Serb Mayor of
Vukovar, Slavko Dokmanovic, who was charged with war crimes.11 At least one commentator
suggests that the success of this arrest was predicated on “the element of surprise and
vulnerability preserved by sealing the…indictment and using the element of secrecy to lure
[Dokmanovic] back from his home in Serbia with a false promise that he could negotiate the sale
of property he owned….”12
From the Dokmanovic case, sealed indictments have flourished in the international
tribunals as they have provided the prosecution with a solution to the operational difficulties of
arresting publicly indicted accused.13
Currently, there are no instruments that expressly condone or prohibit the use of sealed
indictments in international law.14 In fact, it is clear from a review of the rules of procedure and

9

Id. at 596-597.

10

Id. at 597.

11

Id.

12

Id.

Louise Arbour, Symposium on ‘The ICTY 10 Years on: The View from the Inside’, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 396, 397
(2004). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 58].
13

14

Evan J. Wallach, The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: Did they
Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 851, 882 (1999). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at tab 55].
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evidence of the international tribunals, and their relevant case law, that sealed indictments are an
acceptable means to capture accused suspects in international law.
III.

The case law of the Criminal Tribunals
A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The ICTY adopted the approach of requesting orders for non-disclosure due to the

noncooperation of states in executing arrest warrants issued by the tribunal.15 Today, the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY expressly allow the issuance of sealed indictments.
Specifically, Rule 53, the Non-Disclosure rule, which was adopted in April 1994, as part of the
ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, states:
(A) In exceptional circumstances, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may, in the interests
of justice, order the nondisclosure to the public of any documents or information
until further order.
(B) When confirming an indictment the Judge may, in consultation with the
Prosecutor, order that there be no public disclosure of the indictment until it is
served on the accused, or, in the case of joint accused, on all the accused.
(C) A Judge of Trial Chamber may, in consultation with the Prosecutor, also order
that there be no disclosure of an indictment, or part thereof, or of all or any part of
any particular document of information, if satisfied that the making of such an
order is required to give effect to a provision of the Rules, to protect confidential
information obtained by the Prosecutor, or is otherwise in the interests of justice.
(D) Notwithstanding paragraphs (A), (B) and (C), the Prosecutor may disclose an
indictment or part thereof to the authorities of a State or an appropriate authority
or international body where the Prosecutor deems it necessary to prevent an
opportunity for securing the possible arrest of an accused from being lost.16

ACKERMAN AND O’SULLIVAN, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE ICTY, p. 275 (2000). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 49].
15

16

Rule 53, ICTY RPE (2009).
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As mentioned above, Chief Prosecutor Arbour was the first to utilize this provision and
employ a strategy of using sealed indictments to capture high level individuals.
The first case that illustrates the use of sealed indictments in the ICTY is Prosecutor v.
Dokmanović. Slavko Dokmanović was indicted under seal on March 26, 1996, along with three
others, for the mass killing of 260 non-serb men who were removed from Vukovar Hospital in
Croatia.17 Among other things, Dokmanović was charged with crimes against humanity and
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.18 The indictment was confirmed ex parte by Judge
Fouad Riad.19 A few days later, in an ex parte proceeding on April 3, 1996, Judge Riad ordered
the non-disclosure of the indictment.20 The effectiveness of non-disclosure was proven on June
27, 1997 when Dokmanović was arrested by ICTY investigators in Eastern Salvonia.21 That
same day, Judge Riad issued a verbal order, later confirmed in writing, which lifted the nondisclosure of the indictment on account that Dokmanović had been arrested and transferred to
The Hague.22 Since this was the first time sealed indictments were used, challenges to the new
process were inevitable.

17

Indictment, Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-95-13a,
April 1, 1996. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 29].
18

Id.

19

Press Release, The Hague, Apprehension and Transfer to The Hague of an Accused Under a Sealed Indictment,
June 27, 1997. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 62].
20

Order lifting the Non-Disclosure Order of April 3 1996, The Prosecutor v. Slavko Domanovic, July 1, 1997.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 36].
21

Id.

22

Id.
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At an oral hearing on September 8, 1997 Dokmanović claimed “that his arrest amounted
to a kidnapping.”23 However, the Trial Chamber rendered a decision confirming that Rule 53 (of
the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence) is in clear and absolute terms and the non-disclosure
of an indictment “did not violate principles of international law.”24 The decision of the Trial
Chamber both upheld the use of sealed indictments at the ICTY and reinforced Rule 53 of the
ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, thus paving the way for the use of sealed indictments
in future proceedings.
The second case in which the Prosecutor sought a sealed indictment involved Slobodan
Milosevic. In Milosevic’s proceedings, the ICTY gave the first insight as to what satisfies the
threshold set forth in Rule 53 of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to warrant nondisclosure. Milosevic was charged with crimes against humanity involving persecution,
deportation and murder.25 Pursuant to rule 53 of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
the Prosecutor requested the non-disclosure of “the indictment, the accompanying material and
the confirmation materials.”26 In addressing the request of the prosecutor, the tribunal
recognized that Rule 53 empowers Tribunal “to make an order for non-disclosure …where there
are exceptional circumstances and where it is in the interests of justice that the order be made.”27

23

Brian Tittemore, News from the International War Crime Tribunals available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v5i1/html/warcrime.html (1997). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 64].
24

Press Release, The Hague, Trial Chamber Denies the Motion for Releae by the Accused, CC/PIO/251-E, October
27, 1997. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 63].
25

Decision on Review of Indictment and Application for Consequential Orders, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 1999 WL
33483320, ¶ 1 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 25].
26

Id. at ¶ 30.

27

Id.
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In granting the non-disclosure request, Judge David Hunt accepted several assertions by
the prosecution. First, the Judge cited the accused’s high position of power within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.28 Judge Hunt felt that Milosevic’s position
allowed him to exercise power over “their territories and their resources, with all the apparatus of
State at their disposal.”29 Second, the Judge recognized that the acused’s reaction to the
indictment would be unpredictable.30 Finally, the Judge stated that the Prosecutor’s staff and
other persons within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be at the risk of “reprisals and
intimidation” because of the accused’s exercise of power in the area.31 For the above reasons,
the tribunal approved the non-disclosure of the indictment, indicating that doing so would both
minimize the risk of “reprisals and intimidation,” as well as reduce the security risks for all.32
The tribunal’s decision provides the first glimpse of a potential threshold to determine
what is sufficient to issue a sealed indictment. More importantly, as the second major decision
upholding a sealed indictment, the case reinforces the notion that sealed indictments are accepted
at the ICTY.
The following year, the tribunal issued another sealed indictment for the capture of
Radoslav Brdanin and Momir Talic. The two were charged in a sealed indictment that alleged
the accused committed crimes against humanity.33
28

Id. at ¶ 32.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.

32

Id.

33

Decision on Motions by Momir Talic (1) To Dismiss the Indictment, (2) For Release, And (3) For Leave to Reply
to Response of Prosecution to Motion For Release, Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, 2000 WL 33705581, ¶ 2 (2000).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 20]
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Talic was arrested by plainclothes police officers while attending a conference at the
National Defense Academy.34 The secret nature of the arrest prompted angry reactions from
Bosnian officials, and some members of the conference even flew home.35 However, as Arbour
notes, the arrest was siginificant because it showed people that they are always in the
international reach of justice.36
After a series of motions by his counsel to have his indictment dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, Brdanin moved for “provisional release pending his trial.”37 Pursuant to Rule 65(B)
of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence “release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber
only…if it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger
to any victim, witness or other person.38
In analyzing its decision on whether or not to grant the release of the accused, the
Tribunal addressed several contentions by the parties that were both in support of, and against,
the release or Brdanin. Specifically, in addressing the pertinent factors, the Tribunal stated that
“where an accused person has voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal…considerable weight is
often given to that fact in determining whether the accused will appear at his trial.”39 However,
as the Tribunal recognized in this case, since Brdanin was arrested on a sealed indictment, there

34

Marlise Simons, Top Bosnian Serb Officer Arrested for U.N. Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, August 26, 1999 at A10.
[Reproduced at accompanying notebook at tab 59]
35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Decision on Motion By Radoslav Brdanin For Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, 2000 WL
33705586, ¶ 1, July 25, 2000. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21]
38

ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B) (2009). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 3]

39

Decision on Motion By Radoslav Brdanin For Provisional Release, at ¶ 17.

17

is no evidence that he knew of the indictment’s existence.40 Because of this, the Trial Chamber
decided that “absent specific evidence directed to that issue, the Trial Chamber cannot take the
fact that the applicant did not voluntarily surrender into account.”41
The discussion of surrender as a mitigating factor in the Brdanin decision demonstrates
that sealed indictments prevent the Prosecutor may not assert that the accused refused to
surrender voluntarily, as the accused is not given the chance. However, the decision also
prevents the accused from asserting his surrender as a mitigating for himself. Although possibly
controversial, the Tribunal’s acceptance of sealed indictments in relation to Brdanin and Talic
echoes the notion that sealed indictments an accepted form of practice at the ICTY.
Another notable case in which the ICTY issued a sealed indictment involved Radovan
Karadzic. On May 31, 2000 Judge Patricia Wald issued and confirmed the amended sealed
indictment of the Prosecutor (in an ex parte proceeding) agreeing that “the consolidated amended
indictment will expedite the proceedings, should [Karadzic] be arrested.”42 The indictment was
later unsealed on October 11, 2002 by Judge Gunawardana.43
The Karadzic case seems to be the most recent use of sealed indictments at the ICTY;
however, the secret nature of sealed indictments makes it almost impossible to determine
whether any additional sealed indictments currently exist at the ICTY. Unless all of the sealed
indictments are unsealed, we will not have a definite answer as to how many were executed at
the ICTY. However, the prevalent use of sealed indictments at the ICTY shows that sealed
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indictments are both continuously accepted by the Tribunal and are repeatedly utilized to bring
high profile suspects to The Hague.
B. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The Rules of Procedure of the ICTR contain a similar rule to that of the ICTY relating to
sealed indictments. When originally adopted, Rule 53(B) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provided:
A Judge or Trial Chamber may, in consultation with the Prosecutor, also order that there
be no disclosure of an indictment, or part thereof, or of all or any pan [sic] of any
particular document or information, if satisfied that the making of such an order is
required to give effect to a provision of the Rules, to protect confidential information
obtained by the Prosecutor, or is otherwise in the interests of justice.44
However this rule was amended and, today, Rule 53(B) of the ICTR mirrors that of the
ICTY to generally provide that there may be non-disclosure of an issued indictment in, among
other things, the interests of justice.45 Like the ICTY, the ICTR has utilized Rule 53(B) in its
case law to bring accused individuals to trial.
The case of Prosecutor v. Muvunyi exemplifies additional powers that the Tribunal defers
to the Prosecutor. Tharcisse Muvunyi was indicted for genocide, and in the alternative,
complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity in his capacity as Commander of the Ecole
Sous Officers.46 Although the Trial Chamber confirmed the non-disclosure of the indictment on
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February 2, 2000, the Prosecutor later submitted a request to disclose the indictment.47 The
Prosecutor felt that the Non-Disclosure Order no longer served to protect confidential
information or the interests of justice.48 Further, the Prosecutor felt that non-disclosure of the
indictment might actually impair the possibility of receiving assistance to arrest the accused.49
The case of Muvunyi illustrates that the Prosecutor ahs the power to both request
disclosure of an indictment, in addition to non-disclosure of an indictment. This principle laid
was most recently confirmed in Prosecutor v. Ntawukuriryayo where the Trial Chamber granted
the Prosecutor’s motion to unseal an indictment on the grounds that the interests of justice are
not served by keeping the information from the public.50 Finally, the Muvunyi case reinforces
the notion that the Tribunal will offer little resistance when granting a Prosecutor’s request for
non-disclosure.
The ICTY continued its use of sealed indictments in March of 2001 when the Prosecutor
sought nondisclosure of the indictment for Samual Musabyimana.51 The indictment charges
Musabyimana with genocide, or alternatively complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide and crimes against humanity for extermination.52 Specifically, the Prosecutor
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requested the non-disclosure of the indictment until it was served upon the accused.53 The Trial
Chamber granted the Prosecutor’s request pursuant to Rule 53(A). In granting the request, the
Tribunal stated that “the fact that the accused has not been apprehended yet constitutes an
exceptional circumstance.”54 Also, the Tribunal felt that the “non-disclosure of the
indictment…is necessary to facilitate the arrest and transfer of the accused and to ensure the
safety of victims and witnesses.”55
The Tribunal’s reasoning in its decision to confirm the non-disclosure of the indictment
in Musabyimana demonstrates how low of a threshold exists for the Tribunal to grant the request
for nondisclosure. Making the failure of apprehension an acceptable basis for requesting nondisclosure the Tribunal inherently has granted universal acceptance of all requests for nondisclosure. Since the Prosecutor’s will not make a request for a sealed indictment unless they are
pursuing the accused, it seems there is no possible situation where the request for non-disclosure
will not be granted by the Tribunal.
The Musabyimana decision also provided a limit in issuing sealed indictments. In its
decision, the Tribunal denied the Prosecutor’s request to issue sealed indictments against cosuspects that were not named in the original indictment in the original indictment.56 However,
this limit appears to be illusory as the Prosecutor can by-pass this imposed limitation by
amending the original indictment and naming the co-suspects in the new indictment. After doing
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so, the Prosecutor will more than likely succeed in receiving sealed indictments for the cosuspects.
In Prosecutor v. Sagahutu, the accused sought to sever the trial on a claim that the sealed
indictment prejudiced him. Innocent Sagahutu was indicted on counts of genocide for his role as
the Second-in-Command of the Reconnaissance Battalion within the Rwandan Army and as a
commander of “A Company” in the Battalion.57 Although Sagahutu’s indictment was disclosed,
there were joint defendants whose names were non-disclosed in the indictment. Sagahutu’s
counsel filed preliminary motions on June 25, 2001 in response to the indictment claiming that
“that there cannot be a joint indictment between one accused whose trial has already begun and
another accused whose trial has not yet commenced.”58
After reviewing Sagahutu’s request, the Chamber did not agree and denied the motion.
Although the Chamber’s decision lacked reasoning for the specific point, the Chamber did not
feel that the absence of co-accused—whose identities were not disclosed pursuant to Rule 53 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence when the motion was heard—is prejudicial to the defendant
at this stage in the proceedings.59
Sagahutu illustrates that the ICTR will allow the Prosecutor to issue indictments that are
sealed for some parties and unsealed for the others, thus reserving the indictments’ element of
surprise for those that may be more difficult to apprehend. Also, the case reiterates the leniency
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of the Tribunal towards the Prosecutor, and is also evidence of the tribunal’s acceptance of
sealed indictments.
The cases above show that the ICTR will rarely (if ever) deny a motion for an indictment
to be kept under seal. By setting such a low threshold in Musabyimana the Tribunal indicates
that apprehending an accused person is more important than accused’s rights to be informed of
the indictments issued against them. Also, the cases demonstrate the reluctance that the Tribunal
has in denying the Prosecutor’s motions for a sealed indictment, thus, giving more weight to the
interests of the Prosecution outweigh as oppose to the accused. Therefore, for the reasons stated
above, it is apparent that sealed indictments are accepted at the ICTR.
C. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the SCSL also contain provisions that allow the
nondisclosure of an indictment. Rule 53(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence reads:
“When approving an indictment the Designated Judge may, on the application of the Prosecutor,
order that there be no public disclosure of the indictment until it is served on the accused, or, in
the case of joint accused, on all of the accused.”60 Although the wordage of the rule differs from
that of the ICTY and the ICTR, the substantive effect of the rule is the same. Further, like the
ICTY and the ICTR, the case law below illustrates that sealed indictments are expressly allowed
and used at the SCSL.
A series of indictments were issued at the SCSL on March 3, 2007 against those accused
for involvement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)/Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC). Out of all of the accused parties at the SCSL, the indictment of Johnny Paul
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Koroma is the only indictment that was issue unsealed.61 Koroma was the alleged leader of the
AFRC,62 which was founded by the members of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone.63 The AFRC
seized power from the elected government of the Republic of Sierra Leone via coup d’état on
May 25, 1997.64 It was on this day that Koroma became the elected leader of the AFRC.65 In
this capacity, it was alleged that Koroma exercised authority, command, and control over all
members of the AFRC; participated in a joint criminal enterprise; and had superior
responsibility.66 However, the indictment did not contain a request for non-disclosure because
Koroma fled Freetown a couple of months before the indictment was issued.67 In this case,
although it is speculation, it is likely that the Prosecutor was hoping that the public nature of the
indictment would assist in the apprehension of the accused.
An indictment was also issued for Foday Saybana Sankoh, who was a commander in the
RUF, the Civil Defences Forces and the AFRC.68 The RUF was founded in approximately 1988
or 1989 in Libya.69 The RUF began operations in Sierra Leone in March of 1991.70 Shortly
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thereafter, at the invitation of Koroma, Sankoh ordered that the RUF and the AFRC forces unite
in Sierra Leone.71 For the acts committed while in association with these groups, the indictment
charged the Sankoh with crimes against humanity, violations of the Geneva Conventions and
other violations of international humanitarian law.72 On the same day the indictment was issued,
the Judge issued a decision approving the request for nondisclosure of the indictment.73
Another case at the Special Court involved Issa Hassan Sesay and three other former
leaders of the RUF.

Sesay, Sam Bockarie, and Morris Kallon were all indicted on March 7,

2003.74 About a month later, Augustine Gbao was also indicted.75 For efficiency, the Trial
Chamber later ordered a joint trial between Sesay, Kallon and Gbao.76
Sesay was a senior officer and commander in the RUF/AFRC.77 Sesay held a number of
positions within the RUF/AFRC and was an immediate subordinate to Koroma and Sankoh.78
During the period where Sankoh was incarcerated in the Republic of Sierra Leone, Sesay, by
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order of Sankoh, directed all RUF activities in the Republic of Sierra Leone.79 The indictment
charged Sesay with acting in concert (in a joint criminal enterprise) with Charles Taylor, Sankoh
and Koroma for unlawful killings, abductions, physical violence and sexual violence.80 Without
offering any reason, Judge Bankhole Thompson approved the indictment and ordered that it be
issued under seal.81
That same day the Prosecution issued an indictment for Charles Taylor.82 Taylor was
accused of acing in concert with Sankoh and supporting the actions of the RUF.83 Specifically,
Taylor was charge with, among other things, abductions and forced armed labor, physical
violence, sexual violence and unlawful killings.84 The prosecutor requested that this indictment
be issued under seal. On the same day, the Trial Chamber approved the indictment and
confirmed that it remain under seal until further notice by the Special Court.85
However, at the time the indictment was issued, it was believed that Taylor had fled to
neighboring Ghana.86 Because of this belief, the Prosecutor made the indictment public on his
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own accord and called upon Gahnian authorities to arrest the accused.87 As a result of the
Prosecutor’s actions, Taylor fled to Nigeria.88 However, he was later apprehended and because of
this, on March 30, 2006, the Special Court formally lifted its earlier order and disclosed the
indictment to the public.89
The actions of the Prosecutor in the Taylor case show that, in certain circumstances, the
Prosecutor may deem it necessary to bypass the court system and disclose the indictment
himself. Obviously, his plan backfired as Ghanaian authorities did not arrest Taylor, thus,
allowing him to flee. Although disaster was avoided in the Taylor case because he was
eventually apprehended, Taylor’s decision to flee shows us the impact that unsealing an
indictment can have on the accused.
Alex Tamba Brima was also indicted on March 7, 2003. The indictment alleged that
Brima had joined the Sierra Leon army in 1985 and rose to the rank of Staff Sergeant.90 Brima
was also a senior member of the AFRC,91 and a member of the group that staged a coup and
ousted then President Kabbah.92 Brima was later appointed by Koroma as the Public Liaison
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Officer within the AFRC and also held a position as a governing member of the Junta.93 In early
1998, Brima was in direct command of the AFRC/RUF forces in the Kono district.94
Additionally, Brima was in direct command of the forces that conducted operations throughout
the northeastern and central areas of the Republic of Sierra Leone.95 Finally, it was alleged that
Brima was the commander of the forces that attacked Freetown in January of 1999.96 Because of
his position within the AFRC, the indictment charged Brima with joint criminal enterprise and
superior responsibility.97
The indictment was submitted and approved on March 7, 2003 by Judge Bankhole
Thompson.98 Again, following the previous practice of the SCSL, Judge Thompson ordered that
the indictment be issued under seal pursuant to Rule 53 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Unfortunately, the Tribunal did not offer any reasoning for its order.99
Therefore, as the above illustrates, sealed indictments are accepted and used in
proceedings at the SCSL.
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D. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
The Internal Rules of the ECCC do not contain any provisions that pertain to the nondisclosure of indictments.100 Also, the case law of the ECCC is not as developed as the other
tribunals as the ECCC has only heard two cases thus far, with a total of five defendants.
The first case involved Guek Eav Kaing who was indicted on October 27, 2004.101 Kaing
was indicted for Crimes Against Humanity, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
Homicide and Torture.102 Kaing was indicted for his involvement with the Khmer Rouge.
Specifically, Kaing was the deputy in charge of the interrogation unit of S21, which was the
headquarters of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Special Branch of the secret police.103
The proceedings against Kaing commenced in February 2009.104 However, because
Kaing was already in custody when he was indicted, the ECCC did not need to issue his
indictment under seal.
The second case involved four other defendants. Chea Nuon, Sary Ieng, Thirith Ieng and
Samphan Khieu were indicted on October 27, 2004.105 The accused were charged with crimes
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against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions Genocide, Homicide, Torture and
Religious Persecution.106
Nuon “allegedly exercised authority and…control over the internal security…of
Democractic Kampuchea.”107 Further, it was alleged that Nuon “directed, implemented and
enforced policies of the Communist Party of Kampucheam,” which involved forcible transfers of
the population, enslavement and forced labor.108
Sary Ieng allegedly exercised control over the Ministry in his capacity as the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.109 “He is alleged to have instigated, ordered, failed to prevent and punish, or
otherwise aided and abetted…in acts characterized by murder, extermination, imprisonment,
persecution on political grounds and other inhuman acts…”110
It was alleged that Thirith Ieng exercised authority and control over the Ministry and
subordinate organs as the Minister of Social Affairs and Action for Democratic Kampuchea.111
In this capacity, Thirith Ieng is alleged to have instigated, ordered and aided and abetted for the
crimes that she was indicted for.112
Khieu was the Head of State (Chairman of the State of Presidium), a leader within the
Centre Political Office and as a full rights member of the Central Committee of the Communist
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Party of Kampuchea.113 He is also alleged to have instigated or aided and abetted in the
commission of the crimes that he was indicted for.114
The ECCC does not provide any indication why it chooses not to use sealed indictments;
however, it is possible to speculate some of the reasons why the procedure has not been utilized.
First, the ECCC is a young tribunal compared to the others. Therefore, it may be possible that
the tribunal is “testing the waters” with their current system before they incorporate new
strategies in apprehending the accused. Second, neither the Tribunal’s website, nor any
secondary authority indicates that the ECCC is having any difficulties of bringing highly accused
persons to the Chambers. Therefore, it may not be necessary to keep the indictments secret.
Finally, the Tribunal may not have the resources or the necessary personnel to serve sealed
indictments on the accused.
In summary, the ECCC does not provide much guidance on its position of sealed
indictments. Even though sealed indictments are not used at the ECCC it does not seem that a
situation has presented itself where sealed indictments are necessary. However, given the nature
of sealed indictments it is almost impossible to predict whether the ECCC has issued any until
they are disclosed. Whatever the case may be, it is important to remember that the ECCC has
not condoned the use of sealed indictments at its own facilities or any of the other tribunals.
E. The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) differs from the tribunals discussed above. First,
the Court is an independent institution.115 This means that the Court is not set up by a particular
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nation or Security Council, but by a multilateral treaty. Second, unlike the ICTY or the ICTR,
which were tribunals created in response to a specific conflict and therefore are only temporary;
the ICC is a permanent international tribunal.116 Third, although the Prosecutor can initiate
proceedings, the Prosecutor usually is responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated
information on crimes, which can be referred by State Parties or the United Nations Security
Council.117 Finally, the ICC is a court of last resort and it can not act if a case is investigated or
prosecuted by a national judicial system.118
Because of the unique procedural aspects of the ICC, sealed indictments are not utilized
at the ICC. Therefore, it follows that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC do not
expressly provide for the authorization of sealed indictments like some of the tribunals discussed
above.119 However, the ICC utilizes a “sealed” procedure in other procedural aspects of its law.
The Rome Statute provides two methods by which the Prosecutor can hail someone to the
ICC. Article 58 of the Rome Statute provides that upon receiving sufficient information, the
Prosecutor can request and the Pre-Trial Chamber can issue an Arrest Warrant or a Summons to
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Appear.120 An example of each procedure is analyzed below in a “sealed” context,
demonstrating how the ICC can utilize the similar procedural aspects of its fellow tribunals, even
though they may differ substantively.
The ICC has issued eleven arrest warrants that the public knows about. Of these eleven,
five were originally sealed for some period of time while six were made public immediately.121
Four of the five sealed arrest warrants actually resulted in an arrest and transfer of the accused to
the ICC.122
Uganda was the first of three states to self refer cases from its own country to the ICC.123
Following a referral on December 1, 2003, the ICC began investigating the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA).124

Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen were all

alleged members of the LRA. The warrant of arrest alleged that the LRA directed attacks against
civilian populations.125 By doing so, the LRA engaged in a cycle of violence and established a
pattern of “brutalization of civilians” including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement,
mutilation and forcibly recruiting children.126 In Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, at al., the
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Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant on May 6, 2005.127 Specifically, each defendant had a
significant role in the LRA. Kony, as Chairman and Commander in Chief of the LRA, issued
orders to “target and kill” civilian populations, ordered the LRA to begin the campaign of attacks
and to “loot and abduct civilians.”128
Otti was the Vice-Chairman and Second in Command of the LRA.129 Specifically, the
warrant of arrest alleged that Otti was “the addressee of Kony’s standing orders to attack and
brutalise civilians; that he was responsible for making orders regarding the timing and location of
various LRA operations, as well as for participating in their execution;” and by his role as
intermediary between Kony and the other LRA commanders, Otti was responsible for attacks
committed by subordinates.130
Odhiambo served as the Brigade Commander and Deputy Army Commander.131 Further,
it was alleged that Odhiambo ordered the commission of several crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC.132 Finally, Ongwen was the alleged brigade commander of the Sinai Brigade of the
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LRA.133 Like his co-accused, Ongwen was alleged to have committed many of the same crimes
in his position of the LRA.
The aforementioned situation is the first example of the ICC to utilize a “sealed” method,
as every arrest warrant was initially issued under seal. Similarly, in subsequent situations, the
ICC has issued sealed arrest warrants as an attempt to bring defendants to the ICC. For example,
in the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo the ICC issued sealed arrest warrants
for Thomas Dyilo and Germain Katanga.134 The sealing of the arrest warrants proved effective
as both of the accused were apprehended by the ICC.
Like the Tribunals, the Chambers at the ICC will unseal warrants when circumstances
allow it. In the case of Prosecutor v. Ntaganda the Chamber unsealed the arrest warrant for the
accused for the following reasons: (i) the accused may have become aware of the sealed warrant
against him; (ii) proactive measures have been taken to mitigate the risks for victims and
witnesses involved in the case; and (iii) unsealing the warrant may assist the authorities of the
Democratic Republic of Congo in apprehending Ntaganda.135 This reasoning is evidence that,
although Chambers will seal arrest warrants to pursue the accused, the ICC, like the Tribunals,
recognize that sealed warrants may not always be the best option in apprehending the accused.
Like the sealed indictment method of utilized in the other Tribunals, the ICC’s method of
sealing arrest warrants experiences little resistance from the Judges at the ICC. However, in
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issuing the sealed arrest warrants, the Judges offer little reasoning for their doing so. Overall, the
continued use of sealed arrest warrants and their ability to facilitate in the capture of high level
defendants, make them an accepted practice at the ICC.
Another method that is utilized by the ICC is the issuance of Summons to Appear in
accordance with Article 58 of the Rome Statute.136 The Summons to Appear is similar to that of
an arrest warrant in that the Pre-Trial Chamber bases its issuance on a belief that there are
reasonable grounds that the accused committed the crime.137 However, a summons will be
issued when the Pre-Trial Chamber does not think the accused is a flight risk, whereas an arrest
warrant will be issue when the Pre-Trial Chamber is in doubt that the accused will appear.
Like sealed arrest warrants, the ICC has issued sealed summons to appear on the accused
in an effort to hail the accused to the ICC. The most recent case that utilized a sealed Summons
to Appear involved the Situation in Darfur, Sudan. On November 20, 2008 the Prosecutor issued
a request for a Summons to Appear for Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed
Jerbo Jamus on a confidential basis.138 In the request the Prosecutor alleged that that the two
accused participated in attacks at Military Group Site Haskanita.139 Specifically, the Prosecutor
alleged that the events which took place during the attacks “gave rise to crimes [of violence to
life], [attacking personnel or objects involved in a peacekeeping mission] and [pillaging].”140
Taking the Prosecutor’s allegations into consideration, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued the
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Summons to Appear and ordered that it be kept confidential from the public. Subsequently the
summons was unsealed on June 15, 2010.141
It is hard to determine whether sealed methods used by the ICC assisted in the
apprehension of the accused; however, the ICC clearly recognizes an advantage to using sealed
methods in the jurisprudence. Therefore, the ICC’s acceptance of using sealed arrest warrants
and summons to appear are further evidence that using various “sealed” methods to apprehend
defendants is accepted in international law.
F. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon
The Rules and Regulations of the STL contain a Non Disclosure provision for
indictments. Rule 74 of the Rules and Regulations contains similar language to the ICTY’s Rule
53 section A and B.142 However, Rule 74 of the Rules and Regulations for the STL omit section
C and D of the ICTY’s rule.143
From the information that is currently available, the STL has not issued sealed
indictments against any alleged defendants. However, the Rules and Regulations of the STL, as
well as the case law of the other criminal tribunals, are evidence that the STL could utilize sealed
indictments if they chose to do so.
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IV.

Is it legally possible to issue sealed and confirm indictments Ex Parte?
Although ex parte proceedings are controversial in some regards, it is legally possible to

issue a sealed indictment for both implicit and explicit reasons. Ex parte is a Latin term that
means “from the part.”144 The term is defined as “on or from one party only” or “without notice
to or argument from the adverse party.”145 Thus, it follows that an ex parte order is “an order
made by the court upon the application of one party to an action without notice to the other.”146
The definition of an ex parte communication is what gives rise to the implicit ability to
issue and confirm sealed indictments ex parte. To better illustrate, it benefits us to review the
indictment procedure at the international tribunals. Although they may differ in some ways, the
ICTY provides the best illustration of the indictment process in its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
First, the Prosecution will begin an investigation into a particular matter. Pursuant to
Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Prosecutor may summon and question
suspects, victims and witnesses.147 Also, the Prosecutor is entitled to “undertake such other
matters as may appear necessary for completing the investigation and the preparation and
conduct of the prosecution at the trial.”148 Next, the Prosecutor may seek the assistance of any
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State authority concerned, as well as any relevant international body.149 Finally, if the
Prosecutor is satisfied with his investigation he can request orders from a Trial Chamber or
Judge.150 In this case, the requested order would be a sealed indictment.
If the Prosecutor is “satisfied in the course of [his] investigation that there is sufficient
evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, [he] shall prepare and forward to a Registrar an
indictment for confirmation by a Judge.”151
Next, the registrar will forward the indictment and material to a designated judge, who
will set a date to review the indictment.152 After the designated judge receives and reviews the
materials he may: (i) request that the Prosecutor present additional material in support; (ii)
confirm each count; (iii) dismiss each count; or (iv) adjourn the review to give the Prosecutor the
opportunity to modify the indictment.153 As illustrated above, in this point of the proceedings, if
the Judge confirms the indictment, he may order that the indictment is issued under seal pursuant
to Rule 53. However, it is important to note that an indictment will only be issued under seal at
the Prosecutor’s request, and it is not at the Judge’s discretion to issue an indictment under seal
upon his own accord. Finally, if the Judge confirms the indictment, he may issue an arrest
warrant and the suspect shall have the status of an accused.154
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The implicit ability of the Tribunals to issue and confirm sealed indictments lies in the
nature of the indictment proceedings and the definition of a sealed indictment. Using a fictional
character, Mr. A, we can see how sealed indictments are implicitly allowed in international law.
Suppose Mr. A was a high profile leader of an indigenous tribe within a State and feels that his
people are being persecuted. Because of this, Mr. A deems it necessary to kill all the people who
are not members of his particular tribe. To do so, Mr. A uses his leadership and power to form
and army and subsequently murder 100,000 people who are not members of his tribe. After
some time has passed and peace has been restored a tribunal is set up to bring Mr. A and his
subordinates to justice. However, Mr. A is aware of this and decides to hide within the country
and avoid being arrest.
In accordance with the procedures above, the Prosecutor would begin an investigation
into the alleged crimes that Mr. A and his followers committed. After the Prosecutor has
conducted a series of interviews and gathered all of the information relevant to the situation, the
Prosecutor believes that there are reasonable grounds to charge Mr. A with genocide. Acting on
his belief, the Prosecutor goes to the Tribunal that has been set up and requests that the presiding
Judge issue an indictment for Mr. A, charging him with genocide. However, the Prosecutor
knows that if Mr. A learns of the indictment he will flee the country and may never be seen
again. Therefore, the Prosecutor requests that the indictment be issued under seal. After
reviewing all of the relevant information, the Judge issues the indictment and orders that it is
kept under seal.
Although the above illustration may be elementary, it follows the same pattern as the
actual cases before the several Tribunals in their search for their high profile defendants.
Further, the example shows that the Tribunal has the implicit power to issue sealed indictments
40

ex parte. In none of the examples, real or fictional, was the accused present while the Prosecutor
conducted his investigation or requested a sealed indictment. Moreover, the accused was not
present when the Tribunal made its decision to order that the indictment be issued under seal. If
Mr. A was present during the proceedings, then it would be unnecessary to have indictments
sealed. If the accused party were present at the proceedings (making it a non-ex parte
proceeding), then the sealed indictment loses its main attribute of secrecy, thus, defeating its
purpose in international law.
The only conceivable situation in which a sealed indictment may be necessary where the
accused is not present, is if a tribunal were to appoint a public defender pursuant to its rules of
procedure and evidence. For example, the ICTY and the ICTR both provide that the tribunal
may appoint a public defender in order to protect the interests of the accused.155 However, these
specific rules of the ICTY and the ICTR only apply to an accused if they are detained by the
respective tribunal.156 For this reason, the Tribunals will not appoint a public defender to defend
the accused’s interest in a sealed indictment motion because the accused is not yet apprehended
by the Tribunal. Therefore, it can be implied that it is legally possible to issue a sealed
indictment ex parte because the only situation in which a sealed indictment is necessary is one
where the accused is not apprehended, which is a situation where the accused does not qualify
for a public defender.
Second, case law exists in which Tribunals have explicitly issued orders in ex parte
proceedings. The first example comes from the ICTR, where the Tribunal granted the request
for nondisclosure in the Musabyimana case. In the order, in the Pre-Trial Chamber it indicates
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that it recalls the “Prosecutor’s Ex Parte Motion for Non-Disclosure of the Names of Witnesses
and Other Identifying Information in the Indictment.”157 Since the accused was not present at the
decision to grant the request, it is clear that the entire procedure, from request to order, was
conducted only in the presence of one party making it ex parte. Since these proceedings were
accepted by the Tribunal it is clear that the Tribunal felt the ex parte proceeding was legal.
Similarly, the Prosecutor issued the same type of request in Prosecutor v. Kanyaarukiga.
In this case, the decision of the Trial Chamber is in response to the “Prosecutor’s Ex Parte
Request to Rescind the Non-Disclosure Order…Relating to the Indictment and Warrant of
Arrest.158 Again, this illustrates that the Prosecution can issue requests and those requests can
subsequently be granted on an ex parte basis, thus providing the validity of the proceedings in
international law.
Finally, if we revisit the Darfur situation at the ICC, the decision to issue a summons to
appear indicates that the Prosecutor “requested the Chamber to issue warrants of arrest or,
alternatively, summonses to appear for Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo
Jamus, on a confidential and ex parte basis.159 Additionally, the accused were also not present
when the Pre-Trial Chamber made its decision, granting the Prosecutor’s request, also making it
an ex parte proceeding. Therefore, these decisions indicate that proceedings can take place ex
parte, thus supporting the notion that sealed indictments can be issued legally ex parte.
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V.

Conclusion
This memorandum has provided an overview of the case law of sealed indictments in the

international legal system. The ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and STL each have provisions in their
respective Tribunal’s rules that allow the use of sealed indictments. Further, the ICC also
utilizes the equivalent of sealed documents, but since the ICC does not issue indictments, there
are no provisions that expressly allow the issuance of sealed indictments. Also, each of the
Tribunals, with the exception of the STL, has used sealed indictments in their international
proceedings.
Therefore, this memorandum concludes that it is legally possible to issue and confirm
sealed indictments in international law. If it were not implicitly possible to issue sealed
indictments ex parte, then the practice would cease to exist. Further, the several motions
accepted in Criminal Tribunals are explicit evidence that it is possible to issue sealed indictments
ex parte
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